CONVERTING PORK INTO PORCELAIN
Cultural Institutions and Downtown Development

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The importance of cultural institutions to contemporary revitalization efforts in U.S. cities is attributed to several factors. First, the transformation of the urban political economy has made cities more dependent on their consumption economies. Second, urban cultural institutions have a strong interest in improving their surroundings, especially now that they have become more dependent on revenue-generating activities and on funding sources interested in attracting broad audiences. Finally, cultural hierarchies have become less rigid, allowing cultural institutions to draw on serious and popular art forms.

American cities have rediscovered their cultural resources. During the past two decades, city officials have learned to value the historic communities that their predecessors have been eager to raze; have dubbed desolate, derelict warehouses "arts districts"; and have committed local tax dollars to their museums and performing arts complexes, many newly built or recently expanded. A survey of 65 U.S. cities (those with populations of 250,000 and above) finds that 71 major performing arts centers and museums have been either built or substantially expanded since 1985 (see Table 1).[1] From Charlotte's Blumenthal Hall, to Los Angeles' Getty Museum, to Seattle's Benaroya Hall, a cultural building boom is clearly under way.

Of course, cultural facilities have always concentrated in urban areas. What is new and interesting, first, is that so many new facilities have been built in a relatively short time span, and so many have been built outside

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TABLE 1: New and Renovated Major Cultural Facilities in U.S. Cities with 250,000 Population, 1985-2005

City	*Facility*	*Built/ Renovated*[a]	*Date*
Albuquerque	New Mexico Cultural Center	Built	2003
Anchorage	Alaska Center for the Performing Arts	Built	1988
Atlanta	High Museum of Folk Art	Built	1986
	Fox Theater	Renovated	1993
Austin	Jack S. Blanton Museum of Art	Renovated	2001
	Austin Museum of Art	Built	2001
Baltimore	Lyric Opera House	Renovated	1992
	Walters Art Gallery	Renovated	2001
Charlotte	Blumenthal Hall	Built	1992
Chicago	Symphony Center	Renovated	1997
	Museum of Contemporary Art	Built	1998
	Mexican Fine Arts Museum	Renovated	2000
Cincinnati	Aranoff Center	Built	1995
	Contemporary Arts Center	Renovated	2001
Dallas	Dallas Museum of Art	Built	1985
	Meyerson Symphony Hall	Built	1989
	Nasher Sculpture Garden	Built	1999
	Dallas Center for the Performing Arts	Built	2004
Denver	Denver Museum of Art	Renovated	2001
Detroit	Opera House	Renovated	1996
Fort Lauderdale	Museum of Art	Renovated	2000
Fort Worth	Bass Center for the Performing Arts	Built	1998
	Amon Carter Museum	Renovated	2001
	Fort Worth Modern Art Museum	Renovated	2002
Houston	Museum of Fine Art	Renovated	2000
	Hobby Center for the Performing Arts	Built	2002
Indianapolis	Murat Center	Renovated	1996
Kansas City	Nelson-Atkins Museum	Renovated	2000
	Performing Arts Center	Built	2005-2006
Los Angeles	California Plaza	Built	1985
	Getty Museum	Built	1998
	Kodak Theatre	Built	2002
	Walt Disney Concert Hall	Built	2002
Miami	Bass Museum of Art	Renovated	2000
	Performing Arts Center	Built	2001
Milwaukee	Milwaukee Art Museum	Renovated	2000
	Baker Theatre Complex	Built	1989
Nashville	Frist Center for the Visual Arts	Built	2001
New Orleans	New Orleans Museum of Art	Renovated	2001
New York City	Ford Center for the Performing Arts	Renovated	1997
	Museum of American Folk Art	Renovated	2000
	Museum of Modern Art	Renovated	2002

TABLE 1 continued

City	Facility	Built/ Renovated[a]	Date
Newark	Newark Museum	Renovated	1986
	New Jersey Performing Arts Center	Built	1997
Orlando	Orlando Museum of Art	Renovated	1997
Philadelphia	Kimmel Center for the Performing Arts	Built	2001
	Philadelphia Museum of Art	Renovated	2002
Phoenix	Dodge Theater	Built	2001
Pittsburgh	Andy Warhol Museum	Built	1994
Portland	Portland Museum of Art	Renovated	2000
San Francisco	Cowell Theater	Built	1985
	Davies Symphony Hall	Renovated	1992
	Fine Arts Museums	Built and Renovated	1998
	Floreance Gould Theater	Renovated	1995
	Museum of Modern Art	Built	1998
	Yerba Buena Center	Built	1993
	War Memorial and Performing Arts Center	Renovated	1997
	Asian Art Museum	Renovated	2002
St. Paul	Ordway Theater	Built	1985
Seattle	Seattle Art Museum	Built	1991
	Seattle Asian Art Museum	Renovated	1994
	Benaroya Hall	Built	1998
	Seattle Center Opera House	Renovated	2000
Tampa Bay	Tampa Bay Performing Arts Center	Built	1987
Washington	Arthur M. Sackler Gallery	Built	1987
	Corcoran Gallery	Renovated	2001
	Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts	Renovated	2000-2007
	Lincoln Theatre	Renovated	1994
	National Building Museum	Renovated	1985
	National Portrait Gallery	Renovated	2000-2004
Wichita	Wichita Art Museum	Renovated	2001-2003

SOURCE: American Association of Museums 1999, 2001; author's survey.
a. Built = newly constructed or in construction/planning process; renovated = significant increase in space, converting facility from one use to another, or allowing closed facility to reopen.

traditional cultural centers such as New York, Boston, Chicago, and San Francisco.[2] Second, whereas once the arts were considered a luxury, supported by philanthropy and enjoyed by an elite group of connoisseurs, today's cultural institutions are constructed as an explicit part of a city's economic revitalization program. This shift reflects changes both in the political economy of cities and in the organization and mission of highbrow cultural institutions. This article examines these changes and shows how they have led to an increasingly close and mutually beneficial relationship between urban political, economic, and cultural entrepreneurs.

The urban cultural building boom, this article maintains, represents a confluence of three related trends. First, cities seeking to attract businesses with quality-of-life amenities are eager to support the development of cultural institutions, especially in their once moribund centers. They believe that these institutions will increase the city's symbolic capital and catalyze other, unsubsidized commercial activities. Second, cultural institutions are drawn by their own economic needs and by the imperatives of their funding sources to seek broader audiences and exploit more commercial, income-generating strategies. They are able to achieve these goals without completely sacrificing their aesthetic legitimacy because, third, the boundaries between high culture—once their dominant domain—and popular culture have blurred. Cultural institutions today are thus better positioned than those of 100 years ago to become active stakeholders in urban growth politics.

CULTURE IN THE GROWTH COALITION: WHY BUSINESS AND POLITICAL LEADERS NEED THE ARTS

Business elites have long recognized that the prestige of high arts institutions could bring economic benefit to their hometowns, but policies explicitly drawing on the arts to achieve economic development goals have only recently become common. The urban renewal projects of the 1950s and 1960s occasionally included cultural institutions—landmarks such as New York's Lincoln Center and Washington's Arena Stage were built on sites cleared of tenement housing with the support of city development officials, business elites, and the cultural institutions that would inhabit them (Toffler 1964, 1973). However, during this period, most city planners and businesspeople still saw investments in culture as incidental to the main city development goals of industrial retention and office and housing development.

By the 1980s, the dominant urban development policy paradigm had shifted away from "smokestack chasing" in which cities competed for investment by offering lower costs (Bailey 1989). Competing for corporate headquarters and producer service firms, economic development practitioners realized, required more than just abating taxes and improving infrastructure. Clark (2000) maintains that today's educated workers are more likely to choose appealing locations, most notably those with attractive natural and cultural resources, and then consider their employment options. In this model, firms that rely on highly skilled labor have greater incentive than ever to either choose amenity-rich locations or to strive to improve the quality of life in their headquarters city. As cities compete for mobile, skilled workers and the firms that employ them, low taxes may be less important than riverfront parks, sports arenas, and historic districts. Moreover, city officials have become ever more aware of the economic importance of tourism and have put a great deal of energy into building and enlarging convention centers (Sanders 1998), subsidizing new hotels, and attracting major retailers (Friedan and Sagalyn 1989; Hannigan 1998; Judd 1999).

Cultural institutions represent an important element of the recreational infrastructure thought to make a city more appealing to tourists and investors (Eisinger 2000; Hannigan 1998). Corporations have come to see the presence of local arts institutions as a business asset, and their support for such organizations represents good business sense as much as philanthropy. Ford Motor's marketing director, who was asked why his company has nearly single-handedly kept Detroit's opera company solvent, noted that the presence of such an institution made it easier to recruit white-collar employees (Bradsher 1999). Donors to the New Jersey Performing Arts Center made this point as well (Strom 1999).

City governments and place-based business elites have become more intent on marketing their cities. Local boosterism, of course, is hardly new, but today professionals with large budgets have replaced the well-intentioned amateurs of an earlier era (Ward 1998; Holcomb 1993). Moreover, as is true throughout the business world, city promoters have moved from a model of *selling*, where one tries to persuade the buyer to purchase what one has, to *marketing*, where one tries to have what the buyer wants (Holcomb 1993). Marketers do not merely come up with a catchy jingle; they seek to remake the city, or at least the most visible part of the city, to conform to the expectations of the affluent consumers they want to attract. Cultural institutions, associated with beauty, good taste, and higher purpose, become singularly important symbolic assets for image-conscious marketers.

At the same time, development practitioners and scholars began to appreciate that the arts comprise a wealth-generating economic sector, one in which urban areas retain a competitive advantage. Since the 1980s, the economic impact of the arts has received considerable attention. In major cultural capitals like New York, the "culture industry," as the production and consumption of the arts is called, comprises an important economic sector (National Endowment for the Arts 1981; the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 1993). Even in less obvious places, the culture industry plays a measurable economic role (Perryman 2000).

Cultural projects are valued for more than their direct economic impact. They are built in locations well situated to transform waning downtowns, obsolete factory districts, and disregarded waterfronts. New museums and performing arts centers now feature architectural designs that embrace and enhance their surroundings, rather than isolate their audiences from the city around them, as had been the case in an earlier generation (Russell 1999). And the new projects have been seen as a means of bringing life—and economic impulse—to central cities that are too often deserted after business hours. Philadelphia's Kimmel Center for the Performing Arts, it is hoped, will anchor new economic activity in Center City, where until recently check-cashing businesses and nude dance halls were as common as restaurants and theaters. During the past decade, Seattle has built two major arts facilities downtown: a new home for the Seattle Art Museum, opened in 1991, and Benaroya Hall, a performing arts complex built primarily for the Seattle Symphony, which opened in 1998. Seattle business leaders credit these cultural institutions with a downtown revival that includes the development of several major retail complexes and a 40% increase in the number of people living downtown since 1990 (Byrd 1997).

The arts can also lend greater legitimacy to other urban development efforts. One hundred years ago, urban arts patrons were quite clear about their hope that cultural institutions would serve to placate a growing immigrant working class (Horowitz 1976). As Boston entrepreneur Henry Lee Higginson wrote in 1886, "Educate and save ourselves and our families and our money from mobs!" (Quoted in Levine 1988, 205). The social control function of urban arts institutions today is far subtler. To David Harvey (1989), the contemporary urban spectacle—which includes ephemera like street fairs and festivals, as well as more institutionalized cultural facilities and entertainment districts—has become a way of co-opting the oppositional politics of the 1960s. To others, the presence of culture, especially serious, nonprofit culture, can serve to legitimize urban redevelopment among those who would not normally see themselves as its beneficiaries. Large-scale urban renewal projects can be made more palatable to voters and opinion shapers (if not always to those displaced in their wake) when they are packaged as new cultural centers or filled with public art (Miles 1998). In the words of a National Endowment for the Arts official,

> The arts . . . are like Mom and apple pie; they're consensus-makers, common ground. People can easily focus on the arts activities in a new project, instead of dwelling on the complicated costs and benefits public support for private development activity usually entails. (Quoted in Clack 1983, 13)

Arts organizations therefore represent a significant and unique component of the amalgam of downtown consumption palaces Judd (1999) has labeled the "tourist bubble." Urban scholars have analyzed the actors in the urban tourism and entertainment infrastructure, including retail mall developers, convention center operators, and major-league sports franchises, to understand why they are drawn to participate in downtown real estate projects (Friedan and Sagalyn 1989; Rosentraub 1997; Danielson 1997; Sanders 1998). Cultural institutions, however, have not received similar attention from urban political economists, even though their incorporation into urban growth politics begs explanation. Urban scholars have not asked why an elite cultural institution, whose legitimacy has long been based on its ability to showcase the most serious, academically sanctioned art, might join with those seeking to develop and market the city to the widest possible audience. Today's cultural institutions, however, have been affected by some of the same pressures as city governments. Living in a more competitive environment in which entrepreneurship and marketing are held to be the key to their survival, arts organizations have themselves been transformed.

CULTURE, CONSUMPTION, AND REVITALIZATION: WHY ARTS INSTITUTIONS NEED URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Cultural institutions are not just the objects of urban development schemes: They have themselves become active promoters of revitalization and place marketing activities, and they have done so to realize their own institutional goals. Cultural facilities, especially art museums, must expand to remain "competitive" in the art world, and their expansion needs often place them at the center of local development plans. They have at least five important reasons for wanting to be part of the area's revitalization.

First, some of their concerns about the city's economic health may derive from the interests of their trustees (Logan and Molotch 1987). In nearly every city, there is considerable overlap between those who are prominent in the city's highest business circles and those who are active on cultural boards. One study found that 70% of the members of Louisville's most prestigious development organizations also served on the boards of cultural organizations. (In contrast, those active in peak economic development groups were far less likely to be found on human service agency boards, suggesting the unique importance of arts organizations to those most concerned with the city's development) (Whitt and Lammers 1991). It would be a mistake, however, to assume that major cultural organizations are mere extensions of profit-seeking trustees. Cultural board members usually grant the arts professionals a great deal of autonomy in running the institution's operations.

Nominations to the most prestigious nonprofit institution boards are coveted; those invited to join are unlikely to jeopardize the hard-earned esteem of their peers by asserting a self-serving agenda (Ostrower 1998).[3] The business interests of board members provide a context for institutional decision making, but they are unlikely to be the primary imperative pushing cultural organizations toward a development agenda.

Second, cultural institutions need to bring their customers—the cultural audiences—to them. People are unlikely to visit a place if the surrounding community is thought to be dangerous. Many cultural consumers are not arts aficionados willing to go anywhere to see, say, a particular Rembrandt, but rather those for whom arts events are part of an entertainment experience. Not only will high crime and extensive physical deterioration put a cultural institution at a disadvantage, but so also will a dearth of amenities like good restaurants.

Third, numerous studies indicate the extent to which cultural institutions depend on tourist visits (the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 1993; McDowell 1997). New York's Museum of Modern Art estimates that two-thirds of its visits are from out-of-towners, and half of those come from overseas.[4] Of those who visited the Los Angeles County Museum of Art Van Gogh exhibition in 1999, 56% came from outside Los Angeles (Morey and Associates 1999). Cultural institutions therefore have a strong interest in the city's overall appeal to tourists.

Fourth, cultural institutions are heavily dependent on the availability of local volunteers (there are 2.5 volunteers for every paid museum staff member, according to the American Association of Museums). Location in an impoverished city or in a declining neighborhood may make it more difficult to recruit volunteers. Fifth, wealthy individuals and corporations, which provide the program funds for many cultural organizations, usually focus their giving in their hometowns. When a corporation fails or relocates, local arts organizations lose an important source of support.

In sum, arts organizations in thriving areas will have more visitors, more volunteers, and greater fund-raising success than those in depressed areas.

It is clear that arts organizations benefit when their cities are economically healthy. Moreover, cultural groups are learning that they can benefit when they are perceived as one of the sources of that economic health. Today, preparing a study of one's economic impact seems to be a staple of large arts organizations and local arts councils. Such studies are of questionable economic merit (Cwi and Lyall 1977)—as Eisinger (2000, 327) notes, "Consultants hired by project proponents often seem to pull their multipliers out of thin air." But their purpose is not rigorous cost-benefit analysis; rather, they are tools used by arts groups in their efforts to gain funding and political support. The claim that flourishing arts institutions are important to the urban economy has given arts advocates a rationale to appeal for government support even when tight budgets and political controversies might make public arts funding difficult to obtain (Wyszomirski 1995).

By emphasizing their importance to local revitalization, arts administrators have also been able to gain access to new funding sources. The construction of the New Jersey Performing Arts Center (NJPAC) was supported by $106 million in state contributions, mostly from funds earmarked for economic development activities. Such a large sum would not have been made available for a cultural project had it not been able to claim an important regional economic impact—New Jersey's entire annual cultural budget has never been higher than $20 million (Strom 1999). Arts projects in Louisville, Seattle, and Philadelphia all received generous capital grants from state governments, grants that were clearly tied to the economic mission of these institutions. Similarly, major arts institutions are receiving support from private sources that are more interested in urban revitalization than in art. New Jersey financier Ray Chambers, a man who had never shown much interest in cultural activities but who was deeply committed to the future of Newark, spearheaded the development of NJPAC. Clothing manufacturer Sidney Kimmel made clear in remarks broadcast on local radio that his $15 million donation to Philadelphia's new performing arts center was in support of the center's urban revitalization promises. Arts institutions can show funders that their contributions are not mere charity but rather serve as investments in the city's economic future.

NEW AUDIENCES, NEW PATRONS: WHY TODAY'S CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS ARE WELL POSITIONED TO PARTICIPATE IN URBAN DEVELOPMENT

FUNDING AND ORGANIZING HIGH CULTURE

Cultural institutions may have long had a clear interest in the city's economic health, but only recently have they emerged as ideal partners for the sorts of growth-oriented coalitions described in Mollenkopf (1983), Logan and Molotch (1987), and Stone (1989). The participation of cultural institutions in urban development coalitions has been facilitated by far-reaching changes in arts patronage and arts management ongoing at least since the 1960s. If nineteenth-century institutions looked to wealthy families for financial support, since that time the private collector/patron has been largely eclipsed by more institutionalized forms of funding.[5] Many wealthy families now route their donations through foundations, the largest of which have professional staffs. Since the mid-1960s, the single most important patron of high culture has been the government. The National Endowment of the Arts will have a budget of about $115 million in 2001-2002, and the 50 state governments have allocated $447.5 million for arts and cultural programs in fiscal year 2001 (National Association of State Arts Agencies 2001). During the 1970s, corporate funding became an increasingly significant source of support. According to the Business Committee for the Arts, corporate support for culture increased from $22 million in 1967 to $1.16 billion in 1997,[6] and corporate arts funding tripled during the 1975-1985 period (DiMaggio 1986).

Changes in arts funding affect arts programming in ways that have implications for economic development policies. More so than private patrons, government agencies and corporate donors seek programs with broad audience appeal (Zolberg 1983; Alexander 1996). The National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) and the state arts councils are eager to associate with programs whose popularity can translate into political support for their efforts. For businesses, cultural donations are a "highbrow form of advertising" (Alexander 1996, 2), as corporations seek to attach their names to programs that are highly visible and prestigious. A well-placed, $200,000 cultural donation, according to one corporate foundation official, can have the same impact as $50 million in paid advertising.[7] Government and corporate funding influence the form of cultural offerings as well as the content. Few corporations want to fund a museum's operations; they prefer to attach their name to special, traveling exhibitions that attract large crowds in a number of cities. Alexander (1996) correlates the growth of government and corporate funding with the increasing number of special, "blockbuster" exhibits mounted by museums (and there may well be similar parallels in others kinds of arts institutions). Museum managers see such events as opportunities to attract large, paying audiences (many museums charge for such special exhibits) and generate new members who will continue to support the museum once the special exhibit has moved on.[8]

If such big-ticket events bring benefits for museum managers, they also fit well into the marketing strategies of urban development and tourism officials. Indeed, arts advocates, economic development officials, and the tourism industry have, since the mid-1990s, consciously sought to promote "cultural tourism." An estimated 50 cultural tourism programs have been founded in state, county, and local convention and visitors bureaus, and two national networks, Partners in Tourism (which is sponsored by American Express) and the Cultural Tourism Alliance, hold conferences and publish newsletters on cultural tourism. The Los Angeles County Museum of Art Van Gogh exhibition that drew so many out-of-town visitors had been promoted heavily by the Los Angles Convention and Visitors Bureau, which advertised “Van Gogh weekend packages” in such upscale publications as *The New Yorker*. The convergence of interests is clear: City marketing officials, arts funders, and ultimately publicity-conscious cultural administrators all find benefit in mounting large, well-publicized exhibits or performances that attract big audiences.[9]

THE SHIFTING BROWS

Highbrow arts institutions would have limited value as economic development catalysts, however, if they were catering to a narrow stratum of social elites and art connoisseurs. But a dramatic shift in the way culture is framed and classified has made an expansion of art audiences possible. Boundaries between serious and popular art, and between the audiences who enjoy them, have become increasingly blurred. Of course, even the high-low distinctions that seemed so secure at midcentury were hardly inevitable; rather, scholars have shown them to be largely a product of the mid- to late nineteenth century (DiMaggio 1982, Levine 1988). In the earlier part of the nineteenth century, concerts might include pieces by Bach or Haydn as well as popular fare; an evening of Shakespeare might be interspersed with acrobatic performances; and fledgling museums displayed works of established, serious artists next to curios (DiMaggio 1982). Even in the late nineteenth century, museums such as Philadelphia’s Pennsylvania Museum unapologetically celebrated industrial design alongside European painting (Conn 1998). Such catholic sensibilities soon vanished in favor of more rigid classification schemes that made some cultural artifacts the exclusive terrain of those with education and money. Cultural objects that had once been universally enjoyed, including Shakespearean plays and Italian operas, were reinterpreted so that their more accessible elements were abandoned, and they became the property of the possessors of cultural capital (Levine 1988). That this reclassification took place in the decades surrounding the turn of the century was not accidental: It represented a response on the part of the upper classes to the growing presence and political strength of an increasingly vocal and politically mobilized working class. Defining an elite culture created a safe haven for the upper classes, who could rely on their association with high cultural goods to legitimize their class position (Horowitz 1976; Bourdieu 1984).

High art and popular culture also became institutionally segregated. Earlier in the nineteenth century, high culture had been marketed through the same commercial mechanisms as popular fare. The Swedish opera singer Jenny Lind made a wildly popular American tour in the 1850s under the sponsorship of P. T. Barnum, and European ballerina Fanny Ellsler, who toured the United States from 1840 to 1842, managed to become the darling of economic and cultural elites while still acquiring a mass following and making good profits selling Fanny Ellsler brand garters, stockings, corsets, and shaving soap (Levine 1988).

By the late nineteenth century, however, high and low art forms each had their own institutional home. Profit-driven entrepreneurs disseminated popular culture. The newly created nonprofit corporation, on the other hand, become the vehicle for disseminating high culture. Museums and orchestras so organized had a mix of public and private purposes that suited their patrons. As private corporations, they remained under the control of their appointed trustees. Because they relied on charitable donations, and not on popular political support, they could maintain high standards of elite culture. And because they were nonprofit, they could make claims to have a broader public purpose than a fully private, profit-seeking operation, thus justifying appeals for public support (DiMaggio 1982). Disseminated through the nonprofit corporation, the artifacts of serious culture could maintain their distance from the marketplace.

Today, however, the distinctions so carefully honed in the nineteenth century have become blurred. Rigid classifications fell under attack from several fronts. Gans (1974, 1999) notes a convergence of tastes dating back to the 1920s. The emergence of the middlebrow provided middle classes with more accessible versions of elite art, and today you do not need highbrow credentials to visit a blockbuster event at an art museum or enjoy a foreign film. At the same time, there was a “gentrification” of lowbrow arts, as elite artists and musicians explored jazz and folk art (Peterson 1997). Today, more modern and accessible art forms like jazz, modern dance, film, and photography can be created and consumed in many different venues and at many different levels, challenging the sorts of hierarchies described by Bourdieu (1984). Moreover, theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that the typical upper-class cultural consumer is no longer the snob, whose consumption of elite culture was linked to his or her rejection of other cultural forms, but the “omnivore,” who consumes traditional high culture but also partakes of a variety of popular genres (Peterson and Kern 1996). The possibilities for mixing audiences of different classes and art of different genres are far greater today than they were at the turn of the nineteenth century.

The boundaries separating the organization of elite and popular culture have shifted as well. High culture remains the domain of elite, nonprofit institutions, but it is increasingly marketed with reference to the symbols and presentations of popular culture and supported by commercial market mechanisms.

Museum shops no longer merely sell postcards and art books. They now feature a whole range of merchandise, some replicas of objects in their collections, some using motifs from objects in their collection (e.g., famous paintings printed on scarves and umbrellas), and some having little to do with their collections but presumably gaining value just by their association with great art. Museums and performing arts centers boast full-scale, four-star restaurants that become part of a city's lure to tourists, and their staffs include people with the business skills needed to help such enterprises run profitably (Alexander 1996).

The obscuring of cultural boundaries has important implications for the value of culture as an element of urban revitalization. Not only can cultural institutions take advantage of the market for arts-associated products. They can also broaden their programmatic offerings without losing their core constituencies. Today's arts organization trustees, apparently mindful of the need to appeal to broader audiences, are able to accept the use of popularizing techniques and commercial marketing without feeling that their elite status is compromised (Ostrower 1998). The Metropolitan Museum features Hollywood costumes; the Guggenheim showcases motorcycles and the work of fashion designer Armani. They do this while displaying their collections of European paintings and Greek sculpture, retaining their base of upscale donors and remaining highly desirable conveyers of status for those fortunate enough to be named to their boards.

Performing arts institutions have exhibited an even greater eclecticism than museums. Because performances are very time limited, a theater's programming can simultaneously appeal to diverse audiences. Indeed, many of today's performing arts centers, built with the goal of having maximum economic impact, contain multiple performance spaces, so that radically different types of performances can take place on the same evening (Rothstein 1998). One need only peruse the calendars of America's leading performing arts centers to find intriguing juxtapositions, as Broadway shows share the theater complex with symphony orchestras, country fiddlers, and travel lectures. In November 2000, just to offer one example, the Tulsa Performing Arts Center's calendar included the Broadway musical Showboat, Brahms Oratorio music, the Moscow String Quartet, the U.S. Marine Band, and a pops concert of Frank Sinatra hits. On one very busy Saturday in February 1998, West Palm Beach's Kravis Center for the Performing Arts hosted singers Steve Lawrence and Eydie Gorme, the Gospel Gala, and the Emerson String Quartet. This is exactly the mix we might expect given the new relationship between the brows. On one hand, distinctions are maintained—these performances all took place in different halls, most likely attracting different audiences who probably conducted themselves according to different codes of behavior. On the other hand, these audiences apparently did not feel that their enjoyment of their brand of art was compromised by their proximity to others enjoying a different kind of performance. A few may have even come back another night to attend one of the other shows.

As long as cultural institutions could not easily cut across genres, their usefulness as vehicles of economic development was limited. They could function as elite establishments, bringing prestige to their city and perhaps attracting a few well-heeled tourists and an occasional amenity-oriented business. However, they would seldom draw large enough crowds or identify with broad enough consumption opportunities to be considered commercial catalysts. On the other hand, organizations offering popular fare might bring in the crowds but would be less likely to earn the support of political and social elites or serve to improve a city's symbolic capital. But this has changed, as we can see when we observe those performing arts center calendars. The Broadway musicals pay the bills. The ethnically diverse programming assures broader political legitimacy. The European art, the symphonic music, the elegant galas affirm an institution's highbrow bona fides to social and economic elites. Institutions of high culture fulfill their unique role within today's urban growth coalitions precisely because they can catalyze profit-generating activities, while bringing their nonprofit, noncommercial credentials with them.

DiMaggio and Powell have theorized that organizations working together in the same "organizational field" come to share structural characteristics to facilitate their relations in a process that is shaped by resource dependencies as well as shared professional norms (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Peterson has applied this theory to the study of cultural institutions and arts patrons, noting that arts organizations have become more professionalized (there are now 40 graduate programs in arts administration) and specialized as arts funding has shifted from private patronage to bureaucratic support (Peterson 1986). The organizational field of cultural production and consumption can perhaps today be expanded to include not just arts organizations and their funders but also the local officials who are involved in developing and marketing the city's cultural offerings. The marriage of culture and development is thus facilitated by the shared goals and norms of their advocates, and increasingly it is institutionalized through cultural tourism offices, arts district promotional agencies, or national collaboratives like the Institute for Community Development and the Arts, a project uniting the advocacy group Americans for the Arts with the United States Conference of Mayors. All are involved in selling an image of an urbane place of cultural sophistication, in which the museum or performance hall lends its panache to the city around it, which reciprocates by creating an atmosphere that promotes the consumption of culture.

ART AND THE ECONOMY: A CHANGING RELATIONSHIP

The cultural life of American cities has always had a complex relationship to the local political economy. Local cultural landscapes were shaped by social rivalries and boosterist regional competition. Such revered institutions as New York's Metropolitan Opera, for example, were created to display the wealth of newly rich industrialists (Burrows and Wallace 1999); the patrons of Chicago's now renowned art museum and symphony sought to assert their cultural parity with Boston and New York (Horowitz 1976). If late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century patrons could appreciate the potential benefits that accrued to those who built cultural centers, however, for those founding nineteenth-century museums and concert halls—in contrast to today's cultural entrepreneurs—economic gain remained subtext. Cultural institutions of their era were built to show off wealth, not to generate it. Reporting on the opening of the (at that time very modestly housed) Newark Museum in 1909, the local press proclaimed, "The city is rich! A part of the wealth of its citizens should be invested in paintings, sculpture and other art objects" (Newark Museum 1959, 7). Businessman and arts patron Joseph Choate, speaking at the Metropolitan Museum's opening, stressed the museum's function as an uplifting source of beauty and urged men of wealth to "convert pork into porcelain, grain and produce into priceless pottery, the rude ores of commerce into sculpted marble, and railroad shares and mining stocks . . . into the glorified canvas of the world's masters" (Tomkins 1970, 23). Today, the relationship between the city's economy and its cultural institutions is understood very differently. Kicking off a fund-raising drive for the expansion of the Newark Museum—the same museum celebrated as a symbol of local prosperity in 1909—New Jersey Governor Tom Kean touted the museum and other urban cultural assets as "catalysts of rebirth," "creating the kind of public image needed for growth and new jobs" (Courtney 1984). Countless public officials and donors have similarly proclaimed their support for culture as a means of spurring an economic revival (Byrd 1997; Davies 1998).

The association of economic development and culture has by now become commonplace, and commentary on this new relationship is largely laudatory. There have been a few cautionary voices: Some urban scholars have expressed concern that an urban development strategy whose primary goal is to attract outsiders to privatized entertainment spaces can be undemocratic and exclusionary (Eisinger 2000; Judd 1999), diverting public funds from projects of more direct benefit to most urban residents (Strom 1999). Even those cultural facilities deemed successful will never generate the tax revenue and employment to make them appear to be good investments in a cost-benefit analysis (National Endowment for the Arts 1981),[10] giving rise to the same critiques that have been leveled against subsidized sports and convention venues (Sanders 1998; Rosentraub 1997). Of course, unlike convention center and sport stadium proponents, cultural advocates have never argued that they could justify public subsidy purely through their production of direct economic benefits. Rather, the arts are said to increase the value of other products and deliver noneconomic benefits as well. Many museums and performing arts centers have effective outreach and education programs that make them genuinely accessible. Surely no other "tourist bubble" institution can make such a claim.

Cultural institutions themselves may face conflicts when they adapt their mission to that of the city's economic development strategists. Hoping for the biggest possible impact on their central city areas, economic development proponents are eager to build new museums and concert halls, and less concerned with sustaining these institutions once they are built. Individual and corporate donors also like to contribute to capital campaigns, where their largesse can be rewarded with wall plaques and naming opportunities. As a result, bricks and mortar investments may be favored over support for cultural programs; smaller arts organizations may be overlooked in favor of the larger groups better able to document their economic clout.

The need to prove their economic mettle to political allies and funders becomes yet one more pressure on cultural institutions already hard-pressed to disseminate great art while paying their bills. The fine arts can certainly be "popular," drawing large audiences. There is also art that is unlikely to play to full houses or attract long lines because it is difficult or challenging or cutting-edge. If arts institutions are primarily seen as mechanisms for urban revitalization and are valued for their ability to draw large numbers of people to city hotels and restaurants, they may be less willing or able to realize the scholarly or educational aspects of their work. To be sure, urban development stakeholders are hardly the only ones pushing arts institutions toward a more commercial, less scholarly mission. And museum curators have often been clever at mounting the kinds of shows that will draw the crowds and pay the bills to gain resources to support more esoteric or challenging programs (Alexander 1996). However, too much focus on the arts institutions' economic role may obscure the fact that making money for the city can never be their primary purpose.

NOTES

1. Major performing arts centers are defined as those with 1,000 seats or more. Major museums are those with annual attendance of 50,000 or more. Because this survey looks only at large cultural facilities, it understates the full extent of cultural building.

2. No doubt cultural institution capital campaigns have been aided by the unusually prosperous 1990s. States and cities had budget surpluses, and wealthy individuals could gain prestige and tax benefits by donating stock market gains to nonprofit arts institutions. Many of these projects, however, originated years before the economic boom.

3. Similar comments were made by cultural trustees of cultural organizations interviewed by the author as part of an ongoing study of Newark- and Philadephia-based organizations.

4. Comments of museum administrator made at the Art of the Deal conference, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, 27 March, 2001.

5. Arts administrators report that individual patrons have gained in importance in the late 1990s; individual giving has been fueled by the strong stock market (comments of museum administrator made at the Art of the Deal conference, 2001).

6. Whitt (1987) has questioned the methods by which the Business Committee for the Arts collects its data; as an advocacy group, it could well be inclined to inflate the importance of business contributions.

7. Comments of corporate foundation executive made at the Art of the Deal conference, 2001.

8. This strategy seems to be successful: Many museums point to big jumps in membership during blockbuster exhibits (Dobrzynski 1998).

9. The media play a role in cementing this convergence of interests. A study of newspaper arts coverage found that visual arts get short shrift in most newspapers, except when blockbuster exhibits come to town. Local media, then, become part of the system making highly visible and popular exhibits useful for arts institutions and local development officials (Janeway et al. 1999).

10. The National Endowment for the Arts studied the arts institutions of six cities and found that only in three did they generate as much or more local revenue than they cost the city in subsidies and services. Had these calculations included the costs of state and federal subsidies, the balance sheet would have even looked less favorable.

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